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ABSTRACT
The globalization of the IC supply chain has raised many secu-
rity threats, especially when untrusted parties are involved. This
has created a demand for a dependable logic obfuscation solution
to combat these threats. Amongst a wide range of threats and
countermeasures on logic obfuscation in the 2010s decade, the
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attack, or one of its derivatives, could
break almost all state-of-the-art logic obfuscation countermeasures.
However, in some cases, particularly when the logic locked cir-
cuits contain complex structures, such as big multipliers, large
routing networks, or big tree structures, the logic locked circuit is
hard-to-be-solved for the SAT attack. Usage of these structures for
obfuscation may lead a strong defense, as many SAT solvers fail
to handle such complexity. However, in this paper, we propose a
neural-network-guided SAT attack (NNgSAT ), in which we ex-
amine the capability and effectiveness of a message-passing neural
network (MPNN) for solving these complex structures (SAT-hard
instances). In NNgSAT, after being trained as a classifier to predict
SAT/UNSAT on a SAT problem (NN serves as a SAT solver), the
neural network is used to guide/help the actual SAT solver for find-
ing the SAT assignment(s). By training NN on conjunctive normal
forms (CNFs) corresponded to a dataset of logic locked circuits,
as well as fine-tuning the confidence rate of the NN prediction,
our experiments show that NNgSAT could solve 93.5% of the logic
locked circuits containing complex structures within a reasonable
time, while the existing SAT attack cannot proceed the attack flow
in them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing cost of integrated circuits (IC) manufacturing
has pushed many semiconductor facilities to shift the integration
procedure from vertical towards horizontal, where many stages of
manufacturing require the involvement of third-party and offshore
entities [6]. Due to the lack of reliable monitoring over these enti-
ties, the trust in the IC supply chain has been called into question.
Hence, as a result of the growth of globalization during IC man-
ufacturing, numerous forms of hardware-based security threats
have been emerged in the last two decades, including but not lim-
ited to overproduction, Trojan insertion, Reverse Engineering (RE),
Intellectual Property (IP) theft, and counterfeiting [35–37, 46].
To protect the IP/IC from being reverse engineered, overpro-
duced, or stolen either in the manufacturing supply chain or in
the field, researchers have studied various design-for-trust (DfTr)
techniques, such as ICmetering, hardware watermarking, split man-
ufacturing, IC camouflaging, and logic locking [1, 11, 22–24, 45, 54].
Amongst these active/passive countermeasures, logic locking a.k.a.
logic obfuscation [22, 24], as a proactive countermeasure against all
these threats, hides the correct functionality of a chip by adding pro-
grammability into the design using post-fabrication programming
values, referred to as the "key". The key values are initiated in and
loaded from an on-chip tamper-proof non-volatile memory, and
only once the correct key is provided, the chip behaves correctly.
In the past decade, the concept and techniques used for logic
obfuscation have gradually evolved, resulting in many forms and
means of logic locking [2, 5, 12, 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 38, 39, 57,
58]. At the same time, the security and strength of logic locking so-
lutions have challenged by simultaneously evolving attack models
[3, 10, 20, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 40, 41, 44, 53, 55, 56]. Amongst all exist-
ing attacks on logic locking, the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based
attack [33, 44] has received the most attention. In the SAT attack,
the adversary has access to (1) one successfully reverse-engineered
yet locked netlist, and (2) the activated/functional IC (oracle). Also,
in the activated/functional IC, the scan chain pins are available
for any test/debug purposes. Hence, for each combinational logic
part of the circuit that is accessible by the scan chain paths, the
SAT attack could be applied independently. The SAT attack has an
iterative structure, and in each iteration, a SAT solver is used to
find a specific input, called discriminating input pattern (DIP) that
finds two sets of keys producing different outputs. After finding all
DIPs, the SAT solver can eliminate all incorrect keys leading to the
extraction of the correct functionality of the circuit.
The strength of the SAT solver comes from their Conflict-Driven
Clause Learning (CDCL) ability. In each iteration of the SAT attack,
a new SAT problem will be created, and the goal of the SAT solver
is to find a satisfying (SAT) assignment for each SAT problem (per
each iteration). The SAT problem is represented in conjunctive
normal form (CNF) consisting of clauses, and each clause consists
of one (a few) literal(s). The SAT solver tries to either assign or
derive the value of each literal, and each assignment of value to
a literal pushes the solver down into one of the branches of its
decision tree. The decision tree of the SAT solver is built based on
DavisâĂŞPutnamâĂŞLogemannâĂŞLoveland (DPLL) tree that is
a complete backtracking-based search tree used for deciding the
satisfiability of propositional logic formula. The traversal on the
DPLL tree is based on a recursive DPLL algorithm leading to the
finding of a SAT assignment (The DIP in each SAT attack iteration).
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After the introduction of the SAT attack, many studies focus on
proposing a logic locking countermeasure that resists against this
powerful attack; However, almost all of them are vulnerable to a
newer attack, and most of the newer attacks are derived from the
SAT attack. For instance, since the SAT solver only works on di-
rected acyclic graphs (DAG), a group of countermeasures evaluates
the possibility of adding combinational cycles to the circuits [5, 28].
However, some studies introduce cyclic-based SAT attacks (cycSAT,
beSAT, and icySAT [20, 25, 56]), in which a pre-processing graph-
based re-encoding has been used before running the SAT attack
to handle combinational cycles in the locked circuit. As another
example, since the input format of the SAT solver is the conjunctive
normal form (CNF), in some recent obfuscation techniques, the tim-
ing behavior (setup/hold time) of the circuit have been targeted that
cannot be translated to CNF [58]. However, further investigation
shows that this breed of obfuscation techniques is already broken
using timingSAT and SMT attack [3, 30], where the delay is mod-
eled using numerical constraints or a theory solver to de-obfuscate
the locked circuit.
1.1 Motivation and Contribution
The SAT attack (or one of its derivatives) is able to break almost all
existing logic locking solutions; However, when the locked circuit
contains some complex structures, the SAT attack faces a chal-
lenging hardness, in which the locked circuit is a hard-to-be-solved
problem for the SAT solver. These complex structures could be any
form of deep/symmetric/tree-based structures, particularly while
they are built by the same basic Boolean logic. For instance, the
work in [44] has investigated that some locked circuits are challeng-
ing for the SAT solver in all contexts, such as circuits that contain
multiplier(s) (e.g. ISCAS-85 c6288). Similar to multipliers that have
uniform distribution of AND/XOR trees for building bit-wise multi-
plication, ISCAS-85 c2670 contains AND-Tree that makes it harder
for the SAT solver. It gets worse when the size of these structures
is large. For instance, in a typical AND-Tree structure, for function
F =
∧N
i=1 xi , that is encrypted using key values, each assignment to
k1...kN in locked function F locked =
∧N
i=1(xi ⊕ ki ) is a singleton
equivalence class, which makes it hard for the SAT solver to be
solved when the size of the function is large. Furthermore, some
recent studies show that depth/size/symmetry could affect the ef-
ficiency of the SAT solver significantly [15, 26]. This observation
results in the introduction of a new category of obfuscation, called
routing/interconnection obfuscation. In this breed of obfuscation
solutions, key-programmable routing blocks (symmetric and deep
MUX trees) have been used for obfuscation purposes. It is illustrated
that when the routing block is in place, the depth of the DPLL tree
in each iteration of the SAT solver would be increased drastically
making the locked circuit a hard-to-be-solved problem for the SAT
solver. Accordingly, the runtime of each iteration of the SAT attack
would be increased significantly in routing-based obfuscation.
In this paper, to increase the strength of the existing SAT attack
when complex structures are in place, we propose NNgSAT, which
is a neural network (NN) guided SAT attack on circuits that locked
with or contain these SAT-hard structures. In NNgSAT, we get the
benefit of a message-passing NN (MPNN) as a classifier. For cases
where the SAT solver takes a long time to find the SAT assignment,
the being trained neural network has been used to push/help/guide
the SAT solver to find the assignment far sooner. Based on the itera-
tive structure of the MPNN (iterative message passing), in NNgSAT,
many of the complex structures will be solved leading us to success-
fully de-obfuscated the aforementioned SAT-hard instance. Given
this goal, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose NNgSAT, a new attack on logic locking in which
a neural network has been used and trained as a classifier to
predict the satisfying assignment on a set of cases that the actual
SAT solver cannot solve.
(2) In the NNgSAT, we engage a 2-step training phase, in which we
first exploit single bit supervision, as well as hyper-parameters
as an initial training phase. This step is followed by the second
step, where the training will be done on the obfuscated circuits
obfuscated by small-size complex structures.
(3) We evaluate the impact of the confidence rate (CR) of the MPNN
prediction on the effectiveness/performance of NNgSAT.
(4) We propose a parallel SAT solving mechanism ensuring that
the performance of NNgSAT could not be worse than the actual
SAT in any form of obfuscations.
(5) Our experimental results show that, on average, NNgSAT suc-
cessfully de-obuscates ∼ 93.5% of cases that the original SAT
attack fails to de-obfuscate them.
2 BACKGROUND
Logic locking adds the possibility of post-fabrication programming
into the supply chain; However, the introduction of the SAT attack
raises a big question about the validity of this countermeasure.
The SAT attack relies on some important assumptions: (1) The ad-
versary has access to the successfully reverse-engineered netlist
with full information about the location of the key gates, locking
technique (algorithm), etc., (2) The adversary has access to an un-
locked/activated chip, and the access to the scan chain pins are
also available for any test/debug purposes. Relying on these as-
sumptions, the SAT attack could be engaged independently on each
combinational logic part, and many studies on logic locking show
that this attack (or one of its derivatives) could break almost all of
the existing logic locking techniques.
2.1 The SAT Attack: Iterative SAT solving of
Miter Circuit
Algorithm 1 SAT-based Attack Algorithm [44]
1: function SAT_Attack(Circuit CL , Circuit CO )
2: i← 0;
3: F0 ← CL (X, K1, Y1) ∧ CL (X, K2, Y2);
4: while SAT (Fi ∧ (Y1 , Y2)) do
5: Xdi ← sat_assignment (Fi∧(Y1 ,Y2));
6: Ydi ← CO (Xdi );
7: Fi+1 ← Fi ∧ CL (Xdi , K1, Ydi ) ∧ CL (Xdi , K2, Ydi );
8: i← i+1;
9: K ∗ ← sat_assignmentK1 (Fi );
Getting inspired by the miter circuit used in the formal verifi-
cation (equivalency check), in each SAT attack iteration, a miter
circuit will be built to compare the (primary) outputs (PO) of two
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duplicated circuits (F0 in line 3 of Alg. 1). Then, a SAT solver will
be invoked to find a satisfying assignment for this miter circuit, in
which for the same (primary) input (PI), noted as DIP, two different
keys must produce two different outputs (line 5). Then, for finding
the next DIP, the new pair of keys must produce the same output
for all previous found DIPs (lines 6-7). Using this iterative struc-
ture, in each iteration, the SAT solver helps to find a new DIP, and
when there is no new DIP, the miter and all constraints generated
so far could identify the correct key (line 9). By using this flow,
the SAT attack provides a very high convergence rate leading to
breaking most of the existing logic locking solutions within a few
minutes/hours.
2.2 Hard SAT Instances in Logic Obfuscation
Many logic locking techniques proposed in the recent few years
trying to break the SAT attack using different approaches. For
example, some techniques try to exponentially increase the number
of iterations (DIPs) required to find the correct key [38, 39, 57].
Some techniques try to lock the timing of the circuit using either
custom-designed cell or flip-flop relocation [13, 58], which cannot
be modeled by the SAT solver. In some other techniques, since the
SAT attack is only applicable to DAG, the combinational cycles
are added for obfuscation purposes, which might trap the iterative
structure of the SAT attack in an infinite loop, or it leads to an
incorrect key [4, 5, 28, 48, 49]. Also, since the SAT solver is only
applicable to combinational logic circuits, and the access to the scan
chain is required for the SAT attack, some techniques try to block
any unauthorized access to the scan chain [14, 17, 18, 42, 47, 51, 52]
to resist against the SAT attack.
Although these techniques were successful at the early stages,
further investigation shows that many of them are vulnerable to
either simple structural attacks or simple derivatives of the SAT
attack in which the formulation is slightly changed or augmented by
a pre-processor or co-processor to generate additional constraints
that make the problem SAT solvable. Examples of such attacks
are cyclic-based SAT attacks, structural-based integrated with SAT
attack, unrolling-based SAT attacks, and SMT attack [10, 30–32, 53].
The SAT attack (or one of its derivatives) works perfectly fine in
all aforementioned scenarios only while it does not face any form of
hard-to-be-solved instances. As a case of hard SAT instances, which
brings difficulties for the SAT solvers, we could list deep or sym-
metric or tree-based structures, particularly while these structures
are only built using the same basic gate, such as large multipliers,
combinational systolic array modules, hierarchical routing blocks,
big AND-tree structures, etc. [15, 26, 34, 44]. Having such structures
sends the corresponded CNF far away being under/over constrained,
and when the SAT problem is a medium-length CNF, it brings
difficulties for the SAT solver. Fig. 1 shows the number of recur-
sive DPLL calls1 for fixed-length 3-SAT CNFs, where the ratio of
clauses to variables is varied from 2 to 8 [7, 15]. As demonstrated,
when the SAT problem is a medium-length CNF (clauses to vari-
ables ratio from 4 to 6), it requires more DPLL calls than under/over
constrained CNFs (>6 or <4). This observation has been the moti-
vation for techniques such as Cross-Lock and Full-Lock [15, 26].
1DPLL algorithm is a recursive-based function that is the main part of the SAT solver
(Line 5 in Algorithm 1) for finding the satisfying assignments.
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Figure 1: The Impact of Clause-to-Variable Ratio on the Median Number of
Recursive DPLL Calls in a SAT Solver [7].
In these techniques, the main block used for obfuscation is a key-
programmable routing block, which helps to build an extremely
large medium-length CNF with thousands of variables. Since it
faces millions of DPLL calls for each iteration of the SAT attack, it
exponentially increases the runtime of each iteration of the SAT
attack. It is surprisingly clear that when a design has such hard-
to-be-solved instances, there is no chance for any of the existing
attacks to break them, which motivates us to propose this new
NN-based attack.
The question we aim to answer in this paper is whether we can
train and use a neural network to predict a satisfying assignment to
the literals of the SAT-circuit CNF and all constraints corresponded
to each iteration of the SAT attack, particularly when the search
tree is extremely deep. The goal is to save time and speed up the
SAT attack. In cases the SAT solver cannot find the DIP for an
iteration, we examine the effectiveness of a message-passing NN
(MPNN) for predicting the DIP. This question is the motivation for
the formulation of our proposed NNgSAT attack.
3 NEURAL NETWORK LEARNS THE SAT
SOLVING
Glimpsing the progress of the SAT community starting around 1992
shows that before 2015 there were the most important conceptual
advances resulting in the modern SAT algorithm based on CDCL.
However, since 2015, the performance improvements has declined
significantly [43]. On the other hand, the substantial ever-increasing
the usage and application of the neural network (NN) on important
problems raises a big question that "can a NN learn and improve the
performance of the SAT solving?". More recently, a study proposes
the first NN-based architecture that is designed for satisfiability
problems, called NeuroSAT [50]. NeuroSAT is a message-passing
neural network (MPNN) that learns to solve SAT problems after only
being trained as a classifier to predict satisfiability. In NeuroSAT,
it is shown that a trained NN on only toy problems could solve a
bigger problem on its own. Also, based on the iterative structure of
MPNN, more iterations at test time leads to solving bigger and even
completely different domains than the problems it was trained on.
For each problem, NeuroSAT starts guessing UNSAT at the early
stages with low confidence until it finds a solution, at which point
it converges and return the satisfying assignment with very high
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Figure 2: High-level illustration of NeuroSAT operating on the graph repre-
sentation of (l it1 ∨ l it2) ∧ (¬l it1 ∨ ¬l it2).
confidence. The training phase of the NeuroSAT relies on a single
bit of supervision, in which the only difference between a pair of
SAT/UNSAT problem is one bit.
Since the SAT solver accepts the problems in CNF format, and
since the SAT problem has a syntactic structure that could be en-
coded into a vector space, the best way to encode a SAT prob-
lem using a NN is to model it using an undirected graph. In this
graph, there is one set of nodes each represents a literal, and one
more set of nodes each represents a clause. For edges, there is a
set of edges between each literal and each clause it appears in,
and also there is another set of edges between each literal and its
complement. Fig. 2, shows a simple example how a SAT problem
((lit1 ∨ lit2) ∧ (¬lit1 ∨ ¬lit2)) could be represented with an undi-
rected graph with aforementioned rules. Nodes on the top represent
each of the four literals, and nodes on the bottom represent each of
the two clauses.
Assuming that this graph-based representation will be used for
building the architecture of the NN, it could be parameterized by
simply two vectors related to literals/clauses (Linit ,Cinit ). Also,
considering that a message-passing approach is used for the NN,
the multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) could be (Lmsд ,Cmsд ,Lvote ),
and as a special form of recurrent NN (RNN), there exists two layer-
norm long short-term memory (LSTM) networks for literals and
clauses (Lu ,Cu ) [21]. Considering nv as the number of variables
and nc as the number of clauses in a SAT problem, to model it to be
solved using the iterative structure of the MPNN, at every time step
t , the NN has a matrix L(t ) ∈ R2nv×d whose ith row contains the
embedding2 for the literal i and a matrix C(t ) ∈ Rnc×d whose jth
row contains the embedding for the clause j , which are initialized
with Linit and Cinit respectively.
Using this formal definition, a single operation of voting (one
iteration of message passing) consists of applying the following two
updates, in whichM is the (bipartite) adjacency matrix defined by
M(i, j) = 1 if {i ∈ j }, Flip is the operator that takes a matrix L and
swaps each row of L with the row corresponding to the literalâĂŹs
negation, and both Lth ∈ R2nv×d and Cth ∈ Rnc×d as the hidden
states for Lu andCu respectively, which initialized to zero matrices:
(Ct+1,Ct+1h ) ← Cu
([Cth ,M⊤Lmsд(L(t ))]) (1)
(Lt+1,Lt+1h ) ← Lu
([Lth , Flip(L(t ),MCmsд(C(t+1))]) (2)
In this model, each iteration consists of two stages. First, each
clause receives messages from its neighboring literals and updates
its embedding based on the current embeddings (Fig.2a). Next, each
literal receives messages from its neighboring clause as well as from
its complement and updates its embedding based on the current
embeddings (Fig.2b). By using this scheme, after T iterations, it
could compute L(T )∗ ← Lvote (L(t )) ∈ R2nv , which is a single scalar
representation of the vote for each literal, and then computes the
2The row corresponding to a clause/literal referred to as the embedding of that
clause/literal.
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Figure 4: Extracting the Satisfying Assignment using 2-Clustering K-means.
average of the literal votes y(T ) ←mean(L(T )∗ ) ∈ R. This vote could
be used as a parameter to show the confidence rate (CR) of the
prediction provided by the NN.
Fig. 3 provides a better representation to understand how iterative-
based MPNN could be used to predict and guess the satisfying as-
signment for a SAT problem with a scalar representation of the
vote (CR). It illustrates the sequence of literal votes for 24 iterations
L
(1)
∗ to L
(24)
∗ ,
(
L
(T )
∗ ← Lvote (L(t ))
)
, as the NN runs on a SAT prob-
lem. As shown in Fig. 3, to clarify the voting of each literal, L(T )∗ is
reshaped to be an Rnv×2 matrix so that each literal is paired with
its complement (the ith row contains the scalar votes for xi and x¯i ).
As shown in Fig. 3, for iterations at the early stages, almost every
literal is voting UNSAT with low confidence (light blue). Then, a
few scattered literals start voting SAT for the next few iterations.
However, it is not dominant to affect the mean vote. In most cases
with a sudden change, there is a phase transition, and all the literals
(and hence the network as a whole) start to vote SAT with very
high confidence (dark red). After this phase transition, the vote for
each literal converges, and the network does not need to continue
evolving.
As shown in Fig. 3, most of the variables have one literal vote
distinctly darker (higher confidence rate) than the other. Also, the
dark votes have all approximately the same color tone, and the
same color tone could be seen for light votes. Based on this dis-
tinguishable coloring, it turns out that there exists a meaningful
relationship between the satisfying assignment and these patterns
(Darker votes are 1s and Lighter ones are 0s). However, to have
a more reliable decoding solution, it could be translated using a
2-clustering mechanism calculated by the k-means algorithm. As
shown in Fig. 4, applying 2-clustering on the literal votes in each
iteration (Lt ) helps to distinguish between 0s and 1s to correctly
extract the satisfying assignment (blue and red dots denote literals
set to 0 and 1, respectively).
A key observation of the NN usage for solving SAT problems is
that it can solve SAT problems that are far larger than the models
used during training. This is when the NN runs more iterations
of message passing leading to find the satisfying assignment. As
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Figure 5: NeuroSATâĂŹs success rate on SR(n) for a range of n as a function
of the number of iterations T .
an example, Fig. 5 shows the success rate of the NN on SR(n)3
for a range of n as a function of the number of iterations T . The
NN is only trained on SR(U (10, 40)) (the number of variables n
is uniformly sampled from between 10 and 40 during training),
however, as shown in Fig. 5, even though it is trained on SR(40)
and below, it solves SAT problems sampled from SR(n) for n much
larger than 40 by simply running for more iterations.
The observation that NeuroSAT can solve problems that are sub-
stantially larger and more difficult than it ever saw during training
(by simply running for more iterations), motivates us to engage an
MPNN to examine the effectiveness of this form of the solver for
de-obfuscation purpose particularly while there exists hard-to-be-
solved structures in the locked circuit.
4 NNGSAT:A NN GUIDES THE SAT ATTACK
As its name implies, in NNgSAT, getting inspired from NeuroSAT,
a message passing neural network (MPNN) has been engaged and
trained on the specific SAT problems obtained from logic locked
circuit to be used as a guide for the SAT solver within the SAT attack.
Given the SAT attack algorithm illustrated in Algorithm 1, to get
the benefit of the MPNN, after being trained using the generated
data set(s), the MPNN-based SAT solver is called in parallel with the
actual SAT solver per each SAT iteration. Fig. 6 provides an overview
of the major steps in the NNgSAT attack. As can be seen, most
steps are similar to the traditional SAT attack. However, per each
iteration, after updating the CNF ofmiter+constraints, and adding
the new double-circuit for finding the new DIP, both the SAT solver
and MPNN-based SAT solver will be called in parallel to solve the
updated CNF. Based on a pre-defined threshold time (SATtimeth ),
if the actual SAT solver could find the satisfying assignment before
SATtimeth , the MPNN-based SAT solver will be skipped, and for
the next step both solvers will be called again. However, in those
cases that the SAT solver could not find the satisfying assignment
within SATtimeth , a part of the predicted satisfying assignment by
the MPNN-based SAT solver, which have the highest literal votes
(CR), will be extracted as a new (guiding) learned constraint, to help
the actual SAT solver for finding the precise satisfying assignment.
Since the MPNN-based SAT solver is called in parallel with the
actual SAT solver, after SATtimeth , we assume that T iterations
of the MPNN-based SAT solver is executed (T times of message
3SR(n) is a distribution over pairs of random SAT problems on n variables, in which
one element of the pair is satisfiable, the other is unsatisfiable, and the two differ by
negating only a single literal occurrence in a single clause.
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Figure 6: The Major Steps of NNgSAT Attack.
passing). As shown in Fig. 6, in MPNN-based SAT solver, for a
CNF with nc clauses and nv variables, set of clauses (C) and set of
literals (L) will be initialized with nc clauses and 2nv variables (nv
variables + nv negated variables). Then, similar to the NeuroSAT,
for T iterations of message passing, C and L would be updated in
two stages: (1) clause updating: based on the current embeddings of
the literals it contains (∀, ← Cu (,∑∈ Lmsд()), (2) literal updating:
based on the current embeddings of the clauses it occurs in, plus the
current embedding of its negation (∀, ← Lu (,∑∈Cmsд(), )¯. Also,
to have better convergence, a nc × 2nv sparse matrix G has been
used, in which Gi, j=1 if and only if the ith clause contains the jth
literal. Similar to NeuroSAT, the Flip(L) function swaps the first
half of the rows of a matrix (L) with the second half. Also, to acquire
better projection, after T iterations, the NN flops L to proceed the
prediction. The Flop(L) function concatenates the first half of the
rows of a matrix with the second half along the second axis. Then,
the flopped L followed by a projection (Vproj as an MLP, to project
into an nv -dimensional vector for completing the prediction (scalar
vote)).
In NNgSAT, the number of message passing operations (the
MPNN iterations) depends on the value of SATtimeth and scalar
vote (CR). We assumed that when we reach at time=SATtimeth ,
T iterations have been done in the MPNN. However, it might be
possible that afterT iterations of theMPNN, the prediction isUNSAT
or even SAT with low CR. Hence, to avoid misguiding the SAT
attack, more iterations are also required in MPNN-based SAT solver.
Hence, to not lose the chance of solving by the actual SAT attack
and to continue using the MPNN, we do not stop any of the solvers
(either actual or MPNN) after SATtimeth . Instead, we define a few
thresholds for the scalar vote (CR) in the MPNN. When we reach
each threshold, we extract the prediction provided by the MPNN,
5
and use those variables that have the highest scalar vote (CR) as a
guided constraint. Then, we run a new actual SAT solver learned
by the miter+constraints extracted from all previous iterations
(successfully done), as well as guided by the MPNN. Hence, based
on the pre-defined confidence thresholds, a few instances of the
actual SAT solver would be run in parallel after SATtimeth , each
is guided by different constraints predicted by the MPNN with
different CR. Amongst all actual SAT solvers executing in parallel,
the first actual SAT instance that returns SAT, will be used as the
solution for the current SAT iteration, all others will be skipped.
Fig. 7 shows three different scenarios in NNgSAT w.r.t. the par-
allel SATs. In Fig. 7(a), after SATtimeth , the CR is less than the first
(minimum) CR threshold (vt1). So, we continue running both to
see which solver reaches the next state. In this case, even before
reaching the first CR threshold (vt1), the actual SAT was able to find
the result. So, we skip the MPNN, and the SAT attack goes to the
next SAT iteration. In Fig. 7(b), after SATtimeth , the CR is still less
than the first (minimum) CR threshold (vt1). However, before find-
ing the SAT assignment by the main actual SAT solver, the MPNN
reaches the first CR threshold (vt1). When the MPNN reaches a
CR threshold, it generates a prediction as a SAT assignment, and
variables with the highest CR (Those variables with CRbit>90%)
will be extracted as a set of the learned clause. Then a new actual
SAT solver (the second instance) will be started guided by the ex-
tracted learned clause acquired by the MPNN. Now, two actual SAT
solvers and MPNN execute simultaneously, and in this case, after
a while, the second SAT instance that was guided by the MPNN
were able to find the SAT assignment far sooner, and two other
instances (the first actual SAT solver and MPNN) will be skipped.
Similar scenarios are demonstrated in Fig. 7(c), where the third SAT
solver returns faster.
It should be noted that in the MPNN-based SAT solver, there
is no dependency between the learned parameters and the size of
the SAT problem. However, since the SAT attack iteratively adds a
new double circuit, as well as a lot of learned clauses found in the
previous iteration, the size of the SAT problem, would be increased
extremely, which makes it very memory-intensive. Hence, to query
the MPNN with more scalability, building the sparse matrix G
would be based on a limited number of non-eliminated variables and
clauses. Although we would like to pass all clauses/variables to the
MPNN, in many cases, the problem would not fit into the available
memory. Hence, we traverse the learned clauses in ascending size
order, collecting part of them that does not exceed a fixed cutoff.
Also, we only query the MPNN on random subsets of the clauses
for problems that exceed the cutoff.
Since both SAT/UNSAT will happen in each SAT attack4, the
MPNN should be able to predict UNSAT as well. To help construct
proofs for UNSAT problems, the MPNN that has been trained on
a large dataset, in which every unsatisfiable problem contains a
small contradiction, learns to detect these contradictions instead of
searching for satisfying assignments. Then, the variables involved
in the contradiction can be extracted and enable constructing a
resolution proof more efficiently. The NN cannot predict that a
SAT problem is UNSAT with high confidence, and it almost never
4Each iteration of the SAT attack returns SAT meaning that a new DIP is found. When
there exists no more DIP, it returns UNSAT, revealing the correct key with one more
SAT solving.
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Figure 7: Parallel Running of Actual SAT Guided by theMPNNwith Different
Scalar Votes (CRs).
guesses SAT on an UNSAT problem. It only predicts SAT, once it
has found one satisfying assignment. Hence, it could be considered
as a certificate of satisfiability.
4.1 Training Dataset Generation
With extensive analysis, we observe that our proposed NN-based
SAT attack works best if the NN is trained in two phases. First, the
NN needs to be initially trained using simple and small random SAT
problems with single-bit supervision to learn how distinguishing
between SAT and UNSAT. Also, with a minor change compared
to the NeuroSAT, as illustrated in Fig. 6, the network is not only
fine-tuned using single-bit supervision, but it also followed by
training with a single set of hyper-parameters as a coarse heuristic
that broadly assigns higher CR to selected variables. This coarse
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Table 1: Specifications of the Modified (_m) Benchmark Circuits (cxxxx_m/bxx_m) After the Insertion of Complex Structures.
Circuit # of Inputs # of Outputs # of Gates # of Multipliers # of Crossbars # of LUTs # of AND-trees
c2670_m 287 161 5,793 1 of 12×14, 1 of 18×18 1 of 24×20 4×LUT-6, 2×LUT-8 2×AND-16
c3540_m 87 47 7,605 2 of 7×10, 1 of 20×16, 1 of 18×22 1 of 18×15, 1 of 20×16 4×LUT-5, 3×LUT-8 2×AND-15, 1×AND-26
c5315_m 206 152 10,851 3 of 11×14, 1 of 12×22 2 of 19×14, 1 of 36×30 6×LUT-4, 2×LUT-6, 2×LUT-7 1×AND-32
c6288_m∗ 85 74 7,378 1 of 20×25 3 of 9×9, 1 of 12×15 2×LUT-8, 1×LUT-9, 2×LUT-12 4×AND-22, 1×AND-52
c7552_m 224 121 12,722 1 of 12×18, 1 of 22×26 2 of 15×15, 1 of 30×36 3×LUT-6, 1×LUT-15 2×AND-15, 3×AND-27
b14_m 289 308 20,407 2 of 8×12, 2 of 12×14, 1 of 36×34 2 of 26×22 2×LUT-11 2×AND-16, 1×AND-44
b15_m 488 526 19,348 1 of 29×25 1 of 30×32, 1 of 36×36 2×LUT-11, 1×LUT-16 3×AND-33, 1×AND-36
b17_m 1452 1512 47,972 2 of 17×21, 1 of 18×22 1 of 26×22, 1 of 32×30 4×LUT-6, 2×LUT-12 2×AND-42
b20_m 527 516 38,856 1 of 8×12, 1 of 32×26 1 of 24×26, 1 of 60×64 2×LUT-11, 1×LUT-14 1×AND-12, 1×AND-48
b22_m 767 757 35,658 1 of 12×14, 2 of 11×11, 1 of 14×18 2 of 17×14, 1 of 24×22 4×LUT-5 1×AND-16, 4×AND-29
∗ : c6288 contains 16×16 multiplier by itself.
learning also helps us to have more reliable (with higher confidence)
predictions for UNSAT problems [9].
Then as the second phase of the training, the NN is trained
specifically for a set of only small-size circuits that contain small-
size of the complex structures, listed as follows:
(1) n ×m bit-wise multiplier built by AND/XOR trees (m,n ≤ 8).
(2) n ×m crossbar network built by 2-to-1 MUXes (m,n ≤ 16).
(3) n−input look-up-tables (LUT) built by 2-to-1 MUXes (n ≤ 8).
(4) n-to-1 AND-tree structures, built by AND2 (binary-tree).
We insert these structures into the circuit as a part of the original
circuit, as well as a part of the obfuscationmodule (key-programmable
crossbars or LUTs). The sizes that are selected for this phase of the
training must be small enough to make them solvable by the tradi-
tional SAT attack. Also, to maximize what is learned by the network
from these special structures, we engage circuits as simple as pos-
sible. To do that, we add these structures into a circuit that only
contains wires connecting outputs to the inputs. In fact, this dataset
only consists of these structures.
5 NNGSAT EVALUATION
To investigate the performance and effectiveness of NNgSAT, we
selected and used large circuits from ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 bench-
mark suite, as summarized in Table 2. For the neural network, we
used NeuroSAT with minor changes in training and message pass-
ing calculations described in Section 4. To compare the results of
NNgSAT with the actual SAT attack, we use the traditional SAT at-
tack [44]. We also use MiniSAT as the SAT solver of both traditional
SAT and NNgSAT. The timeout has been set to 2×105 seconds (∼
two days). All experiments have been done on a Dell PowerEdge
R620 equipped with 28-core Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.50GHz and 64GB
of RAM.
For the training phase, we built two different training datasets.
First, as initial training, to force the network to learn problems sub-
stantive, we define a distribution SR(n) over pairs of random SAT
problems, where one element is SAT, and the other is UNSAT, and
they differ by negating only a single literal occurrence in a single
clause. After fine-tuning over these pairs, we also trained a single
set of hyper-parameters as a coarse heuristic that broadly assigns
higher CR to selected variables, and training is done using ADAM
optimizer [8] with a constant learning rate of 10−4. Second, we built
20,000 obfuscated circuit samples (based on the small sizes from Sec-
tion 4.1), each obfuscated using key-programmable LUTs/crossbars
and solved by the actual SAT solver. Then, we train the NN based
on the output of the actual SAT solver per each iteration.
Table 2: Specifications of the Raw Benchmark Circuits
Circuit: c2670 c3540 c5315 c6288∗ c7552 b14 b15 b17 b20 b22
# of Inputs 233 50 178 32 207 277 485 1452 522 767
# of Outputs 140 22 123 32 108 299 519 1512 512 757
# of Gates 1,193 1,669 2,307 2,416 3,513 9,014 8,367 36,770 19,682 29,162
∗ : c6288 is a 16×16 multiplier by itself.
To show the effectiveness of NNgSAT on complex structures, we
modify the selected benchmark circuits by embedding some large-
size complex structures into the design. To test the efficacy of the
NNgSAT in finding satisfiable assignment in real-circuits, we then
embedded larger-than-trained structures into the raw benchmark
circuits as follows:
(1) n ×m bitwise multipliers built by AND/XOR trees (8<m,n<32).
(2) n ×m crossbar network built by 2-to-1 MUXes (16<m,n<36).
(3) n−input look-up-tables (LUT) built by 2-to-1 MUXes (n<16).
(4) n-to-1 AND-tree structures, built by AND2 (binary-tree).
By using these structures, we built new and modified benchmark
circuits to be evaluated using NNgSAT, as described in Table 1. As
shown, for each design, 1,2, or 3 multipliers with different sizes, 1,
or 2 crossbars, few LUTs, and AND-tree(s) have been inserted to be
considered as a part of the original design. It is worth mentioning
that in a few cases, particularly for smaller circuits, since the wiring
is limited, we had to add extra primary inputs/outputs into the
design to provide the required nets. A comparison between the
original circuits listed in Table 2 and modified (_m) ones listed in
Table 1 shows that some of the modified circuits have more PI/PO.
Furthermore, these modules are embedded with the highest conser-
vation to avoid emerging any form of incompatibility/instability,
such as avoiding the creation of nonsense logic function, bypass
logic, and combinational cycles. It should be noted that the size of
these structures must be large enough to be considered as hard-
to-be-solved instances. On the other hand, the size must be small
enough to keep the overhead less than the acceptable overhead
threshold (e.g. %5-%10)5.
After building the modified benchmark circuits, one more step
is the obfuscation to be assessed by NNgSAT. For obfuscating the
benchmark circuits, we also used the key-programmable form of
these structures. We insert large-size LUTs6 and key-programmable
crossbars with different sizes. More precisely, crossbars with size
18×16, 24×18, and 36×30, as well as LUTs with 10 and 12 inputs
are added into the design.
5Although these structures incur up to 5× overhead in the benchmark circuits, in
the real applications, such as well-known microprocessors, the overhead of these
structures would be less than %5.
6For LUTs, the configuration bits are assumed as the key inputs.
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Table 3: Average Execution Time Comparison between NNgSAT and the Traditional SAT Attack [44].
Circuit: c2670_m c3450_m c6288_m c7552_m b15_m b17_m b20_m b22_m
Attack: NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT NNgSAT SAT
1C18×16, 4LUT10 1607.8 3858.6 1205.7 1205.7 3055.7 timeout 2490.5 2490.5 4661.8 4661.8 2207.4 timeout 2764.9 11706.6 7294.7 timeout
2C18×16, 2LUT12 7207.4 timeout 4184.7 timeout 3112.9 timeout 8679.2 timeout 13212.9 timeout 10766.2 timeout 12647.1 timeout 7554.6 timeout
1C24×18, 4LUT10 2494.7 12029.1 4284.5 4284.5 1285.1 timeout 2570.7 16372.8 7206.4 12473.8 5622.1 timeout 9223.7 timeout timeout timeout
2C24×18, 2LUT12 5670.8 timeout 5991.6 5991.6 2976.1 timeout 7708.4 timeout 11382.4 timeout 10684.5 timeout 10700.5 timeout 14382.8 timeout
1C36×30, 4LUT10 6850.7 23074.5 5573.9 timeout 2403.3 timeout 6189.5 21688.8 7681.1 timeout 9034.8 timeout 9927.8 timeout 11042.1 timeout
2C36×30, 2LUT12 5034.7 timeout 6408.3 timeout 3606.6 timeout 11684.8 timeout 4896.4 timeout 7221.5 timeout 10082.8 timeout 11894.7 timeout
2C18×16, 2C24×18 7920.7 timeout 6270.8 18604.4 1967.2 timeout 5608.5 12685.8 6672.3 timeout 4956.7 timeout 5501.2 timeout 5974.6 timeout
2C18×16, 2C36×30 8134.8 timeout 6303.1 timeout 3007.2 timeout 6122.7 timeout 9501.8 timeout 6079.3 timeout 6442.6 timeout timeout timeout
2C24×18, 2C36×30 8507.3 timeout 7190.8 timeout 4622.9 timeout 8642.8 timeout timeout timeout 12820.3 timeout timeout timeout 10941.5 timeout
∗ timeout = 2×105 Seconds.................... + ncCm×n = nc crossbars with sizem × n controlled by the key. ................... + nl LUTn = nl LUTs with n inputs configured with the key.
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Figure 8: The Impact of Confidence Rate on the Success of MPNN predictions.
Table 3 illustrates the average execution time of the traditional
SAT attack [44] and our proposed NNgSAT on obfuscated bench-
mark circuits. As shown, in many cases, the original SAT attack
fails to extract the satisfying assignment(s) within the allowed
time threshold when a large-size of such complex structures are in
place. However, after being trained over single-bit supervision and
hyper-parameters and expanding the training over only small-size
complex structures, NNgSAT could break almost all obfuscated
circuits within a few hours. Also, NNgSAT is affected far less by the
size of the circuit or the size of the obfuscation module, showing
that correctly being trained, the network could also improve itself
for especially large circuits that never saw during the training. Be-
sides, unlike accelerated SAT solutions (e.g. parallelism of SAT) that
linearly improve the performance, in almost all cases, the NNgSAT
improvement is super-linear.
In some cases, the execution time of the traditional SAT attack
and that of NNgSAT is equal. This shows that in a non-negligible
part of SAT iterations, the network might not provide useful guid-
ance for the actual SAT attack. Hence, when the execution time
is identical, it means that none of the network’s predictions was
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Figure 9: The Impact of Number of Parallel SAT instances on Success Rate
and Speedup of NNgSAT.
helpful for the SAT attack for that case and within N SAT iterations.
Also, since the neural network guidance is prediction-oriented, due
to misguiding that will happen in a few cases, regardless of the size
of the circuit, the performance of NNgSAT might be varied.
This observation shows that the predictions could be categorized
based on their effectiveness: (1) guiding prediction that correctly
guides its corresponding SAT solver to find a SAT assignment, (2)
misguiding prediction that incorrectly guides its SAT solver to an
UNSAT, (3) skipped prediction that are skipped/terminated because
one of the parallel SAT solvers on this problem found a solution.
The ratio of each category is dependent on the CR we choose for
each run. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of two first categories7 based
on different values of CR. As shown in Fig. 8(a, b), when we start the
prediction with lower average CR, the rate of misguiding prediction
is considerably higher. The predictions help more when the average
confidence ratio is 0.7<CR<0.9. Hence, as shown in 8(c, d), to get
the most benefit of the network, CR must be 0.7<CR<0.9.
As we discussed previously, based on the CR, a different number
of parallel SAT solvers guided by the MPNN would be executed. To
examine the impact of the number of parallel SAT executions on
the performance of NNgSAT, we compare the NNgSAT runtime for
different numbers of parallel executions over different CR ranges.
Fig. 9 shows that when we set the CR on a higher range (e.g. 0.8-
0.99), as discussed previously, it requires more message passing to
guide the SAT. Hence, the performance of the higher ranges will
be decreased. However, when we use more cores, it could help to
improve the speed-up. On the other hand, for higher ranges, the
success rate is not considerably higher. For CR 0.8-0.99, the success
rate is only 5% higher than that of CR 0.7-0.9. However, since for
0.7<CR<0.9, it is less restricted, the performance is significantly
7Due to the parallelism, there are some SAT solvers per each iteration, in which the
only one might find the SAT assignment and all others must be skipped. Hence, the
ratio of skipped prediction is far higher and omitted from Fig. 8
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higher89. Hence, the number of cores is set to 8, and CR is 0.7-0.9 to
have the best tuning for the NNgSAT. Based on these observations,
to gather results for Table 3, we used 8 cores (8 different CRs) and
the CR range is set to 0.7-0.9.
6 CONCLUSION
Although the SAT attack (or one of its derivatives) successfully
de-obfuscates many state-of-the-art logic locking techniques, there
exist families of complex hard-to-be-solved structures that remain
challenging for the conventional SAT solver. In this paper, we pro-
posed a neural-network-guided SAT attack, called NNgSAT attack,
which uses a Message Passing Neural Network to predict satisfying
assignments that could help and significantly speedup the conven-
tional SAT attack in solving such cases. Our experimental results
show that NNgSAT could de-obfuscate 93.5% of the logic circuits
locked with or contained complex structures within a reasonable
time, while the original SAT attack fails to de-obfuscate them.
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